



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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# National Intelligence Daily

Tuesday

5 March 1985

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Approved for Release  
Date JUN 1999

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
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LEBANON-UN:

Threats Influencing Draft Resolution

*Shia groups are threatening to kill US military personnel in Lebanon if the US should veto the draft resolution of the UN Security Council condemning Israeli practices in southern Lebanon.*

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President Gemayel does not want to bring the resolution to a vote, but Prime Minister Karami is urging him to do so. Gemayel has been advised to bypass a vote and ask the President of the Security Council to issue the draft as a presidential statement. The USSR is counseling Lebanon to moderate its draft to attract Western support.

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Comment: The death threats will make some Council members reluctant to support the draft.

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
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
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
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
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
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SYRIA-LEBANON: Concern About Shia Radicalism

Syrian leaders, disturbed by the growing militancy of Shia radicals in Lebanon, plan to curb the fundamentalist Hizballah movement.

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
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
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# French Overseas Departments in the Caribbean



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# In Brief

## Americas

- Group in French Caribbean departments plans conference in April on "Liberation of Remaining Colonial Territories" ... expects Libyan, Cuban, USSR observers ... attendance would increase French has external influence on independence movement.
- Salvadoran President Duarte and military seriously considering report from Archbishop that 500 guerrillas want to surrender ... would be major propaganda bonus for government ... earlier such offers through Church failed to materialize.
- Uruguay's new President Sanguinetti has legalized Communist Party and other groups banned under military rule ... planning amnesty for most political prisoners ... opposition parties pushing for total amnesty.

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Asia

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- Chinese parliamentary delegation in Moscow ... first such visit since 1960s ... led by obscure People's Congress Standing Committee vice chairman ... Beijing agreed to trip during Soviet Deputy Premier Arkhipov's December visit.  b (3)
- Iran claims Iraqi aircraft bombed steel plant and gasoline pumping station near Ahvaz yesterday ... also says Iraqi Exocet missile hit near nuclear power plant at Bushehr ... may respond with air raids or shelling of Iraqi border towns.  b (3)
- Bombing yesterday in South Africa of ruling party offices probably work of African National Congress ... only second bombing by group in six months ... still recovering from operational problems caused by expulsion from Mozambique.  b (3)

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### Special Analysis

#### AFGHANISTAN: The War in the Cities

*Fighting in Afghanistan's cities has continued at a high level over the past year, despite Soviet and regime sweeps and stringent security measures. The insurgents are active day and night in the second- and third-largest cities in Afghanistan, Herat and Qandahar. They are able to operate at night even in Kabul.*

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The chief insurgent commander in Kabul Province says that coordination among guerrilla groups has improved markedly in the past year and that the men are much better armed. On important occasions, such as the recent 20th anniversary of the founding of the ruling Afghan party, he says the Soviets and the Afghan regime had to impose extraordinary security measures to prevent costly actions by the insurgents.

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#### Conditions in the Cities

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Kabul is free of insurgent activity in the daytime but that rocket attacks on the airport and on the Soviet Embassy and military headquarters are common at night—so are assassinations and small firefights. Last month the insurgents launched a particularly heavy attack against Soviet positions at Kabul Airport.

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the insurgents control Herat and Qandahar at night and often roam freely in the daytime. Soviet troops usually stay in their garrisons outside the two cities. Military sweeps and retaliatory bombings by the Soviets and the Afghan regime have failed to bring Herat and Qandahar under their control for more than brief periods.

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fighting in the two cities has caused a massive exodus since the Soviet invasion, reducing the populations by more than half. Kabul's population, in contrast, has tripled as fighting in the countryside impels those villagers not inclined to flee to Pakistan to move to the capital.

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In Mazar-e Sharif and Ghazni, security varies by season, with the insurgents generally less active in the winter and during sowing and harvesting seasons. Jalalabad is usually quiet because of the large Soviet military presence there. [REDACTED] b (3)

Urban civilians give the insurgents vital support for operations in their cities, particularly by providing intelligence on Soviet and regime activity. [REDACTED]

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#### Limitations on the Insurgents

The guerrillas cannot establish sustained control over major cities because of the daytime security patrols and superior firepower of the Soviets and the Kabul regime, their sizable troop presence, and Soviet and regime intelligence networks. The insurgents' lack of expertise with explosives and their periodic shortages of appropriate weaponry and ammunition also limit the scope and effectiveness of their operations, as do political, religious, ethnic, and tribal differences. [REDACTED]

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#### Outlook

The war in the cities will continue to frustrate Soviet attempts to consolidate power in Afghanistan. It will increase Moscow's costs by tying down forces that otherwise could be used to maintain supply lines, protect airfields and other installations, and combat insurgents in the countryside. The visibility of the guerrillas' presence in the cities will help keep international attention on the Afghan conflict and thereby increase the political costs for the Soviets. [REDACTED]

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
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
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### Special Analysis

#### YUGOSLAVIA:

##### Plenum on Major Party Debate

*The Yugoslav party plenum that opens today is intended to conclude an unprecedented eight-month debate on the country's economic and political problems, but it almost certainly will not unveil many solutions. Factional and interregional disputes are likely to continue to block effective decisions on key issues.*

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After three years of decline, the Yugoslav economy last year recovered modestly with an expansion of industrial production, imports, and exports. Nevertheless, foreign debts total \$19 billion, inflation hovers around 60 percent, and one worker in six is jobless. Incomes have been cut 40 percent since 1980, and large disparities in wealth remain among the republics and provinces.

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Although a new IMF loan paves the way for private and official rescheduling, there is little evidence of any progress in making long-overdue systemic changes in the economy to lower inflation and assure economic growth and debt repayment.

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##### Federal Versus Regional Power

The leadership has been deeply divided over whether to strip regional officials of some of their political and economic power and over whether to modify the multicommittee political structure, whose rotating leadership has not provided firm direction. Tito himself created this system to relieve concern that one or two nationalities would dominate the other ethnic groups.

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A majority of Yugoslavs, become highly suspicious, therefore, when Serbia—the largest republic and site of the national capital—urges a stronger federal role in some economic decisionmaking and more centralism in the party. Slovenia and Croatia, the two richest republics, object because they realize that a more even distribution of wealth would be at their expense.

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On the other hand, some regional officials from less developed areas support strengthening central authority, despite their fear of greater Serbian nationalism, because they would benefit from a system that distributes resources from the center.

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### Ideological Complications

East European politicians who argue for strong central controls are normally Orthodox Marxists, while pro-reform figures generally are thought to be liberals. In Yugoslavia the breakdown is more along ethnic lines and is more complex. [REDACTED]

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Serbia favors more central party and government power to carry out the economic stabilization program but at the same time urges market-oriented reforms in the economy. Slovenes object to centralism because their economy functions well now. Croats, on the other hand, fear their limping economy would suffer greatly from measures advocated by Serbia. [REDACTED]

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The dispute is further complicated by the debate over the limits of openness and democratization in public life—a conflict heightened by the recent dissident trial. The Serbian leadership and most intellectuals argue that some political liberalization must accompany economic reform. Slovenes also generally favor political moderation. [REDACTED]

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Hardliners, mainly from Croatia and Bosnia, reject both liberalization and economic changes as threatening the party's power. [REDACTED]

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Military leaders are openly worried that deepening political rifts are dividing the officer corps. Defense Secretary Mamula and Army party chief Jovicic have spoken out against disunity, but they also have called for steps to ensure discipline. They warn that extreme and isolated views within the military are unacceptable and will not be tolerated. [REDACTED]

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### Prospects

Ethnic rivalries will continue to override all issues in Yugoslavia, making some officials appear authoritarian on some issues and democratic-minded on others. But there is a growing appreciation that the system of government is not working well enough to correct the country's economic problems. [REDACTED]

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Moreover, increasing public intolerance of IMF-mandated austerity measures could undermine the country's long-term economic stabilization program. The Army probably will continue to criticize the disarray in the party while concentrating its efforts on maintaining discipline within its own ranks. [REDACTED]

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